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Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a familiar concept in
tort law, but it is only recently that res ipsa loquitur has
become involved in medical malpractice litigation. In this
Article, Mr. 0. C. Adamson, II, a member of the Min-
nesota Bar, examines closely the use of res ipsa in this re-
stricted field. He examines the doctrine in light of its use
in several leading decisions and concludes that that which
the courts choose to call res ipsa loquitur is, in fact, an
entirely new doctrine. The effect of this new doctrine,
which the author terms "California res ipsa," is to place
on the defendant doctor the burden of proving, once the
injury is established, that he was free from medical mal-
practice. Mr. Adamson concludes that "California res
ipsa" is, more often than not, a doctrine of liability with-
out fault disguised as a rule of evidence.
0. C. Adamson, I*
In recent years, medical malpractice litigation has greatly in-
creased. This is particularly true in states such as California where
the courts have adopted a doctrine (which they call res ipsa
loquitur) which virtually requires the defendant physician to prove
that he was not guilty of malpractice. The practical result of this
doctrine is the imposition of absolute liability in many cases with
the inevitable inhibition of the medical profession in the legitimate
pursuit of its activities. Perhaps the time has come for a re-ex-
amination and re-evaluation of the problem in light of the experi-
ence of the last 30 years.
Since res ipsa loquitur is incapable of accurate definition, and
no one can say when it is or is not applicable, and few can agree
as to its exact effect when applicable, it would be presumptuous
to attempt to create order out of chaos within the confines of this
brief Article. Perhaps the best solution to the problem would be to
abolish the whole doctrine (whatever the doctrine may be) and
start anew, free from the layers of associations which the years
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
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have heaped upon res ipsa loquitur.1 But the law does not discard
a hallowed and handy doctrine merely because learned writers
and the courts cannot agree. Besides, every lawyer, while unable to
write a definitive treatise on the subject, nevertheless feels that
he has some kind of subjective grasp of the matter so that he
knows when res ipsa loquitur should be applicable although he
cannot say why.2
Therefore, with no attempt to add to the thousands of words of
controversy concerning res ipsa loquitur in general, the following
discussion is limited to the effect of what some courts have called
res ipsa loquitur in the specific field of medical malpractice litiga-
tion.
A convenient starting point is a case which really does not in-
volve res ipsa loquitur (as it is generally understood) at all. In
Maki v. Murray Hosp., a patient was hospitalized for treat-
ment of a facial erysipelas. The patient proved that he entered the
hospital and claimed that his next memory was awakening several
days later with many broken bones and pains. The hospital offered
evidence that he was provided with a full-time nurse; that, while
delirious on occasion, he was never violent; that after being in
the hospital several days, he saw a man (a painter painting the
hallway) through the transom of his room and ran to the nurse
in the adjoining bathroom exclaiming the man was about to shoot
him; that the nurse attempted to calm him and place him in re-
straint; and that he brutally assaulted the nurse, snapped the re-
straint, and dived out a third-story window. Following the cus-
tomary instructions, the jury returned a verdict for the hospital.
The plaintiff claimed error because the trial court had refused to
give a specific instruction on res ipsa loquitur. The appellate court
agreed with the plaintiff declaring, with unusual partisanship,
that there should be a remedy for every wrong and since the
plaintiff was wronged, defendant's verdict should not stand.
Here, the law provides the plaintiff with a case on which he is enti-
1. PROSSER, TORTS § 42, at 201 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Since res ipsa loquitur is the offspring of miscegenation between evi-
dence and negligence, it, like its kissing cousin, the presumption, is of very
mixed blood indeed. It is part logic, part emotion, and part expediency.
Apparently it has a "spirit" which controls its activities in a general
sort of way. It is at once a helpful friend and an unbeatable foe. No
wonder there is no unanimity concerning it.
3. 91 Mont. 251, 7 P.2d 228 (1932). For examples of the proper hand-
ling of this type of case, see Clements v. Swedish Hosp., 252 Minn. 1, 89
N.W.2d 162 (1958); Mesedah v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 194 Minn. 198,
259 N.W. 819 (1935). See also Mounds Park Hosp. v. Von Eye, 245 F.2d
756 (8th Cir. 1957).
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tled to recover, unless the defendant explained away the presumed
negligence. 4
What further explanation defendant could have given is difficult
to say.
Unfortunately, Maki was not permitted to be a maverick case-
soon and well forgotten. Some 12 years later it was reborn with
a vengeance on the west coast-
One day in 1939 it was discovered that Joe Ybarra had acute
appendicitis. His attending physician, defendant Dr. A, made ar-
rangements to have a surgeon, defendant Dr. B, operate on Joe at
defendant Dr. C's hospital. Joe went to the hospital, was given a
hypodermic injection, and slept. Later he was awakened by de-
fendants B and C and rolled to the operating room by a nurse be-
lieved to be defendant nurse D, an employee of C. Defendant
Dr. E administered the anesthetic after positioning Joe on the op-
erating table. The morning after the operation, Joe awoke in his
hospital room attended by defendant nurse F and another nurse
who was not named as a defendant. Joe developed a pain in, and
later a partial paralysis of, his right shoulder. At the trial, Joe
proved the above facts and offered expert testimony that his shoul-
der problem was due to a strain or pressure applied between his
right shoulder and neck. Joe was non-suited and appealed.
In the resulting opinion, Ybarra v. Spangard,5 the California
Supreme Court relied heavily upon the Maki case, applied what
it called the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the "facts," and held
that Joe was entitled to go to the jury.
It is immediately apparent that many difficult questions existed:
(1) Was Joe's shoulder trouble of systemic or traumatic ori-
gin? In view of the expert opinion testimony offered by plaintiff to
the effect that it was traumatic, the question probably would be
for the jury.
(2) If traumatic, when did the trauma occur? The opinion is
silent on this point. In the absence of evidence that the alleged
trauma (i.e., pressure or strain) occurred in the hospital, may a
jury be permitted to speculate? Ordinarily, it is incumbent upon a
plaintiff to show by a preponderance of evidence when his injury
occurred if the time of the injury is material. The court failed to
consider this question.
(3) If the injury was traumatic, and if it occurred in the hos-
pital, was the injury the proximate result of someone's negligence?
4. Maki v. Murray Hosp., 91 Mont. 251, 266, 7 P.2d 228, 232 (1932).
(Emphasis added.)
5. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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The court answered this question by stating that the injury was
"obviously the result of someone's negligence" and that the re-
quirement of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that the accident
must be one which ordinarily does not occur unless someone was
negligent, was "fully satisfied."' Is this true? Ordinarily, it is in-
cumbent upon a plaintiff in a malpractice action to show that the
treatment was unskillful' and that the unskillfulness was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. And, ordinarily, lay jurors and judges
are not competent to determine these questions without the aid of
expert testimony. Can, it be said, as a matter of undoubted com-
mon knowledge, that plaintiff's injury was caused by such sub-
standard treatment? Or did the court also ignore this question by
assuming that which was unproven?
(4) If the injury was traumatic and was caused by malprac-
tice, who was, responsible? Was defendant A, the attending physi-
cian, responsible? Apparently his diagnosis was correct and there
seems to be little question that an attending physician, who refers
his patient to a reputable hospital and surgeon, is not responsible
for unskillful treatment rendered by such independent contrac-
tors.' Was defendant B, the surgeon, responsible? As the operat-
ing surgeon, he is liable not only for his malpractice, but is liable
as well for the nurses and assistants who are under his control
in the course of the surgery.9 But did the alleged malpractice oc-
cur then, or did it occur before or after surgery? Was defendant
E, the anesthetist (or anesthesiologist?), under the surgeon's con-
trol? Today, it is recognized that anesthesiologists are virtually
autonomous and the surgeon is not responsible for the anes-
thesiologist's independent procedures." Was the owner of the
hospital, defendant C, responsible? He is vicariously liable for the
torts of his employee-nurses except while they are under the sur-
6. Id. at 490, 154 P.2d at 689.
7. The Minnesota rule is that
a physician and surgeon is not an insurer of a cure or good result of
his treatment or operation. He is only required to possess the skill
and learning possessed by the average member of his school of the
profession in good standing in his locality, and to exercise that skill
and learning with due care.
Yates v. Gamble, 198 Minn. 7, 268 N.W. 670 (1936). Apparently Cali-
fornia followed the same formula. See Trindle v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. 2d 330,
143 P.2d 932 (1943).
8. See Rodgers v. Canfield, 272 Mich. 562, 262 N.W. 409 (1935);
Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260 (1941).
9. E.g., St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212
Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d 637 (1942).
10. E.g., Thompson v. Lillehei, 273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959), affirming
164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958); Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hosp.
Ass'n, 127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N.E.2d 864 (1956); see also Brossard v.
Koop, 200 Minn. 410, 274 N.W. 241 (1937).
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geon's control.1 Are the nurses, defendants D, and F,. responsible?
They, of course; would be liable only for their acts and are not
vicariously liable for the acts of others.
The court recognized these problems and solved them by a
vague reference to the "reason and spirit" of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur and held:
Where a plaintiff receives unusual [ski] injuries while'unconscious
arid in the course of medical treatment; all those defendants who had
any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might [sic]
have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the in-
ference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct.12
What the court meant by "meet the inference of negligence"
was, for the time being, left for conjecture.
The Ybarra case is a classic example of the old cliche that "hard
cases make bad law" which really means that "bad cases make
hard law." It is true that Joe Ybarra was in a difficult position. He
had a disability and he, personally, apparently did not know how
he acquired it. If he was "wronged," in the legal sense of the
word, he was entitled to a remedy. He, and people like him, are
natural objects of concern and sympathy. But it must be recognized
that every harm is not a "wrong," and that "remedy" means a
remedy against the Vvrongdoer, not against the blameless. The law,
as uttered'by the pens and via the predilections of appellate
judges, is justifiably ttofbled with people like Joe. But it should be
equally concerned with people like'defendants A, B, C, D, E
and F-most of whom logically must have been innocent of any
wrongdoing" and most (if not all) of whom were as incapable
as Joe of showing just how Joe was harmed. The conscience of
the law is hardly salved by affording an innocent man a remedy
against another innocent man. This is especially true in the context
of the defendant'§ activity-the activity of trying to cure the physi-
cal ills of man within the limitation of man's admitted lack of
omnipotence and omniscience.
How did the medical profession get itself into this difficulty?
The reasons are probably numerous and diverse. Throughout the
11. E.g., Moeller v. Hauser, 237 Minn. 368, 54 N.W.2d.639 (1952);
St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn. 558, 4
N.W.2d 637 (1942).
12. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 494, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (1944).
13. Defendant A would appear to be blameless. If B were personally
guilty of malpractice, no one else would be. If a nurse were guilty before
or after surgery, only she and C would be liable. If a nurse were guilty
during surgery, only she and B would be liable. If E were guilty, prob-
ably only he would be liable. Unless D or F were personally responsible,
neither could be liable.
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last half century, the public has acquired an image of the prowess
of the medical profession which is somewhat above its actual
capacities. And this image was engendered, at least in part, by
the airs and attitudes assumed by many medical practitioners.
"Doctor knows best!" Today, the situation is hardly bettered by
the continued emphasis in popular magazines and the sensational
press, to say nothing of TV, of miraculous cures and miracle drugs.
It is no wonder that the general public (some of whom sit on
benches as well as on juries) find it hard to understand that a
physician is fallible and that every failure to cure, i.e., every bad
result, is not evidence of malpractice. Added to this are the factors
of the scarcity of medical facilities in certain areas, the refusal of
physicians to make house calls, the relatively high cost of treat-
ment, the apparent large income of physicians and surgeons (con-
veniently ignoring the costs of a medical education including long,
impecunious years of college, internship and residency), and the
occasional but never forgotten cavalier manner of some physicians.
Finally, it must be added, there is occasional malpractice. But it is
difficult to believe that anyone, no matter how prejudiced he may
be, can really believe that the medical profession, as a profession,
is actually an irresponsible, self-satisfied group of heedless charla-
tans or ghoulish butchers. Despite the over-dramatized and over-
publicized activities of modem medicine, it should nevertheless be
obvious that medicine, due to untiring and never-ending research,
investigation, learning and practice, has made this world a much
better place in which to live than it was 10, or 25, or especially
50 years ago.
It would seem to follow that a completely impartial law-giver,
when faced with the dilemma of an innocent Joe Ybarra and
equally innocent physicians and surgeons (as pointed out above,
even if someone was guilty of malpractice in the Ybarra case, it
is virtually impossible that more than one or two of the defendants
would be liable therefor), the law-giver must decide that the
greater harm will result to society by saddling innocent and blame-
less physicians and surgeons with liability without fault. To the
extent that the medical profession is disturbed and distracted from
its legitimate activities by the fear of baseless, burdensome and
defamatory litigation, society is certainly penalized.
It would also seem that these views would be considered liberal
(whatever that means) rather than conservative or reactionary.
But that is not so. A goodly number of attorneys throughout this
country take the ultra-conservative view of things and openly ad-
vocate the Ybarra doctrine claiming that it is better that the many
suffer in order that one (their present or future client) may bene-
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fit. In view of this philosophy, the expressed basis of the Ybarra
case and its subsequent history must be examined.
As pointed out above, the California Supreme Court found (al-
though no facts recited in the opinion support any such finding)
that Joe was injured while under treatment and that his injuries
were "obviously the result of someone's negligence."14 Therefore,
he was a wronged suitor in need of a remedy. The remedy was
given the name of res ipsa loquitur. The label was false, for the
real remedy was expressed by the court as follows:
The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the various
agencies or instrumentalities which might [sic] have harmed the
plaintiff was in the hands of every defendant or of his employees or
temporary servants. This, we think, places upon them the burden of
initial explanation. Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the purpose
of undergoing surgical treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly
unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one of them as
the person who did the alleged negligent act. 15
This is not res ipsa loquitur. The element of exclusive control is
lacking. Rather, this is a specialized rule of tort law pertinent only
to the medical profession to the effect that
(a) if a patient claims that he sustained an injury in the
course of medical treatment; and
(b) claims ignorance of how and by whom such injury was
caused, then
(c) all who may have been in any way in control of the pa-
tient may be held liable unless each is able to convince the trier of
fact that he was not guilty of malpractice which was the cause of the
injury. The proof of the when, where, how, and by whom of the
case is turned over to multiple, independently acting defendants.
In other words, the court announced an entirely new doctrine"
that in surgery-hospital malpractice cases, any physician, surgeon
or nurse who might conceivably be liable is liable "en masse" un-
less he or she can show freedom from malpractice. The court did
a great disservice when it called this new and strange tort doctrine
(which it obviously felt was justified by public policy) res ipsa
loquitur. For the purposes of clarity herein, this doctrine is re-
ferred to as "California res ipsa."
14. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490, 154 P.2d 687, 689.
15. Id. at 492, 154 P.2d at 690. (Emphasis added.)
16. As Dean Prosser puts it:
The basis of the [Ybarra] decision appears quite definitely to have
been the special responsibility for the plaintiffs safety undertaken by
everyone concerned; and again there is a deliberate policy, similar to
that found in the carrier cases, which requires the defendants to ex-
plain or pay, and goes beyond any reasonable inference from the facts.
PRossER, TORTS § 42, at 208 (2d ed. 1955).
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The court gave several strong hints why it adopted this doctrine.
First, it repeated the "heresy" of Dean WigmoreY':
"[Ie particular force and justice of the rule, [of res ipsa loquitur]
regarded as a presumption throwing upon the party charged the duty
of producing evidence, consists in the circumstance that the chief evi-
dence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured person."' 8
This rationalization has been repeatedly condemned by leading
tort experts as being apocryphal."0 Be that as it may, once a court
approves such a rationalization it becomes the rule.
Following Wigmore's lead, the court went on to hold that all
who may have caused plaintiff's injuries "may properly be called
upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation
of their conduct."2
What did and does this mean? Wigmore's rationalization, while
it may have had some basis when first written in 1905, is hardly
pertgient today. In most jurisdictions, the plaintiff-patient, by
means of depositions and interrogatories and the discovery of docu-
ments, can ascertain and produce "the chief evidence of the true
cause." Such evidence is no lofiger "inaccessible" to the injured
person. Indeed, one of the attorneys who strongly advocates Cali-
fornia res ipsa recently bragged:
However, after the tests were all made, depositions of every one of
the doctors were taken, as provided by the California procedure.
. . . These depositions were bound. Then I added the complete set
of medical records from the hospital (subpoenaed duces tecum un-
der the California piocedure, and photostated). These records and
testimon made a volume over six inches high.* Nothing further could
be said at the trial.21"
Thus, the .Wigmore rationalization today is an anachronism. The
patient, though unconscious part of the time, may determine every
fact prior to trial by discovery. 22
The real reason for California res ipsa lies well hidden in the
Ybarra opinion in the following remarks:
Without the aid of the doctrine a patient . . . would be entirely un-
17. 9 WIOMORE, EvIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed. 1940).
18. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490, 154 P,2d 687, 689 (1944).
19. E.g., PROSSER, TORTS § 42, at 209-10 (2d ed. 1955).
20. 25 Cal. 2d at 494, 154 P.2d at 691.
-21. 3 BELLI, MODERN TRIALs 1998 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
22. In Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 248
Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306 (1956), the court declared that plaintiff has no
obligation to find out about her case by the use of discovery and may rely
on res ipsa loquitur even though all the facts are available to her.
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able to recover unless the doctors and nurses in attendance voluntarily
chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts es-
tablishing liability. 23
This judicial predilection has taken the form of an express ju-
dicial notice in later California cases. For example, in Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, ,the court said:
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in malpractice
cases is a development of comparatively recent years. Before that time,
the facts that medicine is not an exact science, that the human body
is not susceptible to precise understanding, that the care required of a
medical man is the degree of learning and skill common in his profes-
sion or locality, and that even with the greatest of care untoward
results do occur in surgical and medical procedures, were considered
paramount in determining whether the medical man in a given cir-
cumstance had been negligent. But gradually the courts awoke to
the 'so-called "conspiracy of silence." No matter how lacking in skill
or how negligent the medical man might be, it was almost impossible
to get other medical men to testify adversely to him in litigation based
on his alleged negligence. Not only would the guilty person thereby
escape from civil liability for the wrong he had done, but his profes-
sional colleagues would take no steps to insure that the same results
would not again occur at his hands. This fact, plus . . . [lack of
knowledge on the part of the patient], forced the courts to attempt
to equalize the situation by in some cases placing the burden on
the doctor of explaining what occurred in order to overcome an in-
ference of negligence.
24
Thus it appears that one of the bases for California res ipsa is
the difficulty which plaintiff-patients have in presenting expert
opinion testimony that the defendant-physician's treatment was un-
skillful. This situation has been referred to as "The Conspiracy of
Silence." Much has been written about this situation including a
great deal of myth.25 It should be noted that these writers sel-
dom, if ever, point out that some patients cannot obtain expert
opinion testimony simply because there is no malpractice-nor do
they explain how, in view of the supposed conspiracy, so many
malpractice cases are settled.
Be this as it may, the "silence" part of the catch-phrase, refers
to the proof that a particular act or omission is malpractice. As
such, res ipsa loquitur is not the cure. The usual function of expert
opinion testimony in a medical malpractice case is to determine
(a) whether the particular act or omission of the defendant was
negligent (i.e., not in conformance with the standard of skill pre-
23. 25 Cal. 2d at 490, 154 P.2d at 689.
24. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 568, 317 P.2d 170, 175 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
25. See Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and
Common-Law Innovations, 45 MunN. L. REv. 1019 (1961).
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vailing in the community), and (b) whether such negligence is
the cause of the patient's claimed damages.2" Occasionally, expert
testimony is necessary to create a fact question concerning whether
the alleged negligent act occurred.
However, in some situations, the act or omission is proven and
is so clearly malpractice that a jury of laymen can exercise their
traditional function and find that the defendant was guilty of mal-
practice without expert help. Common examples of this type of
case are the leaving of a sponge or other foreign object in the pa-
tient's body following surgery." In these cases, the jury calls upon
its common sense (just as it does in negligence cases generally)
and determines whether the questioned act is so unskillful that it
constitutes malpractice. These cases are not res ipsa loquitur cases.
They are merely cases where the evidence presents such simple, un-
complicated questions that a lay jury possesses sufficient compe-
tence to make a decision without the aid of expert opinions. Also,
in some situations, the damages are so obviously connected with
and flow from the malpractice (as proved by expert evidence
or otherwise) that a lay jury does not need the opinions of ex-
pert witnesses to decide the question of proximate causation.
In cases of this type, the'act of malpractice (e.g., failure to re-
move a sponge) is proven and since the act is obviously wrongful,
some courts have glibly said that since the thing speaks for itself,
this must be a res ipsa loquitur case. Dean Prosser apparently has
fallen into the same error." But the truth is that the proven act
speaks for itself in the same way as any other patently negligent
conduct. If the evidence showed that a defendant drove down a
winding, hilly road at 70 m.p.h. in a blinding snowstorm, his con-
26. Occasionally causation is the most difficult phase of the patient's
case. Generally, res ipsa loquitur assumes causation and if causation is
not to be readily inferred from the other facts, res ipsa loquitur should
not be applied. See Simon v. Larson, 210 Minn. 317, 298 N.W. 33 (1941);
Williamson v. Andrews, 198 Minn. 349, 270 N.W. 6 (1936).
27. E.g., Fowler v. Scheldrup, 166 Minn. 164, 207 N.W. 177 (1926)
(metal suture clamp); Baer v. Chowning, 135 Minn. 453, 161 N.W. 144
(1917) (sponge). See also Moehlenbrock v. Parke, Davis & Co., 145 Minn.
100, 176 N.W. 169 (1920) (use of ether after knowledge of its unfitness);
Moratzky v. Wirth, 67 Minn. 46, 69 N.W. 480 (1896) (failure to remove
placenta following miscarriage). The Minnesota court occasionally had
some difficulty with X-ray burn cases. The cases stand for the proposition
that if the burn is acquired when X-ray is used for diagnostic purposes(i.e., picture taking), expert testimony is not needed; but if the burn occurs
as the result of an X-ray treatment, expert testimony is needed. Compare
Jones v. Tn-State Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 Minn. 217, 136 N.W. 741 (1912),
and Holt v. Ten Broeck, 134 Minn. 458, 159 N.W. 1073 (1916), with
Hayes v. Lufkin, 147 Minn. 225, 179 N.W. 1007 (1920).
28. PROSSER, TORTS § 43, at 210-11 (2d ed. 1955). See Johnson v. Colp,
211 Minn. 245, 300 N.W. 791 (1941).
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duct speaks for itself but the case is hardly one of res ipsa loqui-
tur. After all, res ipsa loquitur is-and perhaps almost all will
agree on this-a form of circumstantial evidence. And when all
the circumstances are known, it has no place. The vice in cases of
this type is that when some courts today are asked to adopt Cali-
fornia res ipsa, they believe they are merely being asked to fol-
low a precedent which they have previously established in the
sponge-type cases.
The function of California res ipsa is to obviate the basic re-
quirement that the plaintiff prove by direct or opinion evidence
that a negligent act or omission occurred and that the injury re-
sulted therefrom. California res ipsa is predicated on the theory
that, under the facts of the case, the patient's injuries might be the
result of some unknown malpractice. Whether the court or the
jury is to decide the applicability of California res ipsa is not
clear.29 Once it is decided that California res ipsa is applicable,
the plaintiff may go to the jury without evidence of any
particular act or omission and without any expert evidence as to
whether the unknown act or omission was malpractice, and with-
out any expert evidence that the act or omission caused the in-
juries."0 California res ipsa reasons backwards from an unintend-
ed and undesired result to the existence of malpractice. The injury
itself is evidence of negligence. The result may be, and often is,
liability without fault.
For example, in Joe Ybarra's second trial, each defendant tes-
tified at length concerning what he or she did and saw. They ex-
plained that none of them could identify any act or circumstance
that could have traumatized Joe's shoulder. Joe obtained a judg-
ment against all the defendants which was affirmed on appeal
with this comment:
It thus appears that reasoning from the circumstantial evidence
the trial judge concluded that respondent suffered a traumatic injury
during the unconsciousness of anesthesia and concluded therefore that,
whether honest or not, appellants' [defendants'] testimony that they
did not observe any incident which could have caused the injury did
not establish that no such injury occurred. 31
29. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal.
App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
30. As Belli puts it:
But it should be realized that res ipsa here is, in effect, two-fold; sub-
stituting not only for proof, but for the necessary expert evidence,
usually impossible to obtain ....
3 BELLi, MODERN TRIALS 1996 (1954).
31. Ybarra v. Spangard, 93 Cal. App. 2d 43, 46, 208 P.2d 445, 446(Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
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In other words, since each defendant was unable to prove con-
clusively that someone did not injure Joe, each was liable.32
California res ipsa reached its high-water mark (it is hoped!)
in Dierman v. Providence Hosp.3" where an explosion occurred
during a nasal operation. The patient proved that she was burned
while under anesthesia. The defendants proved that there were
four possible causes of an explosion of this type-and that only
two of such causes could possibly be the result of any malpractice
on their part. The case was submitted with California res ipsa in-
structions and the jury understandably found for the defendants.
A bare majority of the California Supreme Court reversed and or-
dered a new trial because defendants had not proved the cause and
thus had failed to prove that they were not responsible for the
cause. The dissent cogently points out the true effect of California
res ipsa as thus applied:
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the majority opinion in
effect imposes upon a defendant even more than the burden of prov-
ing that he was not negligent. It imposes the burden of proving the
actual cause of the accident, for that is the only practical way under
the opinion that defendants can show that they were free from fault.
The imposition of such a burden necessarily involves the adoption of
a rule on grounds of public policy that persons in attendance during
an operation must explain not only their own conduct, but the conduct
of any other person, such as a manufacturer of anesthetics, who might
conceivably be responsible for the accident, as well as the forces of
nature that brought it about. Such a rule would impose upon doctors,
nurses, and members of hospital staffs absolute liability for unusual ac-
cidents that they cannot explain and might discourage their attending
operations.34
And lest there be any doubt that California res ipsa is, more
often than not, a doctrine of liability without fault disguised as a
rule of evidence or proof, one of the leading exponents of Cali-
fornia res ipsa had this to say:
There is a wider use of res ipsa loquitur in California probably than
in any other jurisdiction. It is used there in the multiple defendant
cases for discovery as well as shifting the secondary burden of proof.
32. In Oldis v. La Societe Francaise de Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 130 Cal.
App. 2d 461, 279 P.2d 184 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955), the Ybarra rule was
used to hold liable no less than eight defendants (including the referring
physician) of malpractice although logically only one or two or probably
none were liable. Is this not reminiscent of the Nazi rule that, in the event
a German occupation solider is killed, the first eight Frenchmen seized will
be executed unless the guilty party reveals himself?
33. 31 Cal. 2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947).
34. Id. at 299-300, 188 P.2d at 17.
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Sometimes with this shifting of proof, there is an imposition of a prac-
tical absolute liability.35
It is therefore important that California res ipsa be recognized
for what it is: a declaration of public policy-garbed in the sheep's
clothing of res ipsa loquitur-to the effect that, because medical
men are too close-mouthed, a physician shall be treated like a com-
mon carrier and shall be liable for a bad result unless the jury
may choose to exonerate him. Otherwise translated, this means that
it is much better for society to err by damning blameless surgeons
with the stigma of malpractice (and with all the attendant conse-
quences to the medical profession) than to err by permitting one
worthy plaintiff to go unrecompensed. If this policy is best for
society, then, of course, it should be adopted by other courts. If,
on the other hand, it is just one more example of the personal-
injury field grinding its selfish ax, then it should be recognized for
what it is and rejected.
The history of California res ipsa is checkered and little may be
gained from following its vicissitudes.35 Generally, it may be said
that the situation is fluid and no one can predict what will hap-
pen in the future. In the upper Middle West, Iowa recently fol-
lowed Ybarra in a multiple defendant situation.3" In a recent
Wisconsin case, in which the patient submitted expert testimony
of malpractice and did not contend that res ipsa loquitur was ap-
plicable in any way, the learned justice ended his opinion with this
cryptic gift:
The plaintiff having made no request in the trial court for instruc-
35. BELLI, TRIAL AND TORT TRENDs, 1958 BELLI SEMINAR at Ixiii
(1959). Where Belli and his brethren are really headed may be gleaned
from the following:
Then, consider the case of where a patient has been advised of the
remote danger of the drug or surgical procedure? Upon whom shall
the risk of failure be placed? Certainly, if ever there is a field for the
application and use of "insurance," it is here. Could it not first be
limited to the cases where, as in Ayers v. Parry [192 F.2d 181 (3d
Cir. 1951)], the court says that there is no fault on either party, in
that "medical knowledge is not sufficiently advanced." Nevertheless,
the patient has to live despite her condition. Insurance or compensa-
tion could here be paid without fault.
3 BELLI, MODERN TRIALs 1997 (1954).
36. Compare Costa v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d
445, 254 P.2d 85 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), with Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 570, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App.
1957).
37. Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 248
Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306 (1956). But see Morgensen v. Hicks, 110 N.W.
2d 563 (Iowa 1961).
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tions as to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or its application in this
case, it cannot be considered here.38
Michigan apparently still adheres to the rule that res ipsa loquitur
is not applicable in malpractice cases.39
The situation in Minnesota is typical of that which exists in
many states today. Generally, the Minnesota court has adhered to
the rule that res ipsa loquitur does not apply in malpractice
cases.40 However, in 1961, the wind, without warning, appar-
ently changed direction. The puzzling opinion in Jensen v. Linner4
should cause the medical and legal professions of the state to pause
and consider where we are now and where we are going. The
opinion, some 8,000 words long, is not susceptible to a simple
generalization. It will be necessary to wait for the next case or
cases to determine the exact proposition upon which Jensen stands.
It, like the Ybarra case, was a hard case. The patient was hos-
pitalized for a hysterectomy-with a gratuitous appendectomy in-
cluded-and the surgery was performed routinely. As the plaintiff
was being removed from the operating room, a lesion was discover-
ed on her ankle. There was no evidence of such a lesion before
the operation. The plaintiff submitted her case on the precise
theory that the lesion was a chemical burn caused by phenol (a
caustic used to cauterize the stump of the appendix) and that de-
fendants (the surgeon and the hospital) negligently permitted the
phenol to come into contact with her skin. The Minnesota court,
after considering the circumstantial evidence, held that there was
a preponderance of evidence to support the plaintiff's theory that
some one in the operating room spilled phenol on her ankle. Thus,
the claimed negligent act was established. Having reached that
point in its opinion, it would seem that the court would have been
justified to follow the sponge-type cases and hold that the alleged
act of malpractice was so simple that a lay jury could determine
the issue without the aid of expert testimony, and, of course, with-
38. Ahola v. Sincock, 6 Wis. 2d 332, 349 94 N.W.2d 566, 576-77(1959). But see Keuhnemann v. Boyd, 193 Wis. 588, 214 N.W. 326 (1927).
39. Dunbar v. Adams, 283 Mich. 48, 276 N.W. 895 (1937); see also
Lince v. Monson, 363 Mich. 135, 108 N.W. 845 (1961). But see Higdon
v. Carlebach, 148 Mich. 363, 83 N.W.2d 296 (1957).
40. Wallstedt v. Swedish Hosp., 220 Minn. 274, 19 N.W.2d 426 (1945);
Johnson v. Colp, 211 Minn. 245, 300 N.W. 791 (1941); Collings v. North-
western Hosp., 202 Minn. 139, 277 N.W. 910 (1938); Yates v. Gamble,
198 Minn. 7, 268 N.W. 670 (1936); Quickstead v. Tavenner, 196 Minn.
125, 264 N.W. 436 (1936); Johnson v. Arndt, 186 Minn. 253, 243 N.W.
67 (1932); Staloch v. Holm, 100 Minn. 276, 111 N.W. 264 (1907); see
Thompson v. Lillehei, 273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959), affirming 164 F. Supp.
716 (D. Minn. 1958).
41. 108 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1961).
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out any res ipsa loquitur. Unfortunately, the court did not do that.
Probably it was embarrassed by the fact that the trial judge gave
a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury which was assigned as
error. At any rate, the court referred to the sponge-type cases42
and said, in effect, "see, we have applied res ipsa loquitur in the
past" and thus the trial court's instructions, considered as a whole,
are not erroneous in this type of case.
But the court did not stop there. It cited Maki and Ybarra
and several other similar cases with this comment:
We do not consider it necessary to discuss these cases though we be-
lieve they are worthy of citation and support plaintiffs position here-
in. 43
CONCLUSION
A dilemma has always existed in tort law. No system of law can
guarantee that all worthy suitors will be successful; nor can any
system afford complete protection for the blameless defendant.
The same dilemma exists in medical malpractice litigation. Cali-
fornia (and the jurisdictions which follow its lead) did not solve
the dilemma. California, as a matter of social philosophy, decided
to weigh the scales heavily in favor of the plaintiff-patient. It de-
termined that it is better to permit the imposition of liability with-
out fault on a physician than to permit a deserving patient to go
without a remedy. It achieved this result by the misuse of a Latin
tag, res ipsa loquitur. Thus, it imported into malpractice litiga-
tion all the controversies and difficulties associated with that doc-
trine. The practical effect is that the physician must conclusively
vindicate himself or suffer the consequences no matter how blame-
less he may be and no matter how impossible it may be for him to
"explain." The jury, which is not unnaturally sympathetic to the
plight of the plaintiff, is the final arbiter. The very real and cogent
difficulties which face a professional man in the pursuit of a far
from exact science such as medicine apparently are no longer of
importance.
The question is: Where do we go from here?
42. Moratzky v. Wirth, 67 Minn. 46, 69 N.W. 480 (1896). The court
also relied on an X-ray diagnosis case, Jones v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co.,
118 Minn. 217, 136 N.W. 741 (1912).
43. 108 N.W.2d at 718. (Emphasis added.)
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